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FUTURE INTERESTS-POWERS OF DISPOSITION1-SOME PRACTI· 
CAL CONSIDERATIONS IN USING POWERS OF DISPOSITION FOR TESTA-
MENTARY PURPOSES-Testators, in an effort to retain control of 
their property from beyond the grave, have often developed 
schemes by which they attempt to alter the normal devolution of 
title to, and the utilization of, that property by their beneficiaries.2 
One of the primary motives giving rise to such schemes is the 
desire to give the immediate object of a testator's bounty a great 
deal of flexibility and control in the use of the testamentary prop-
erty, while reserving to the testator the possibility of controlling 
its further disposition upon the death of such person.8 The most 
theoretically suitable device by which testators have yet imple-
mented this desire is the gift of a life estate with a power of dis-
position to the first taker and a gift over in the event that the 
property so given is not entirely consumed during his lifetime. 4 
A number of practical and theoretical problems are involved in 
the use of such an arrangement, problems which have been the 
cause of extensive litigation resulting in little uniformity of deci-
sion.5 The practitioner, faced with a choice of using this or some 
other method of fulfilling a testator's desires, should not be un-
aware of these problems. 
1 Also called powers of consumption and powers of invasion. These powers allow 
a donee to encroach upon and use the principal of a testamentary estate within 
limits defined by the donor. 
2 Norvell, The Power To Consume: Estate Plan or Estate Confusion1, Mich. S.B.J., 
March 1949, p. 5. See also Schuyler, Some Problems With Powers, 45 ILL. L. REv. 57 
(1950). 
3 Summers, Power of a Life Tenant To Dispose of a Fee, 6 IND. L.J. 137 (1930). 
4 The testator can so condition the power as to be fairly certain that some propcny 
will be left for the remainderman. See text infra at 1330. But cf. Norvell, supra note 2, 
at 11, regarding this advantage as outweighed by the disadvantages of confusion and 
wasteful litigation. 
5 See Note, 28 IND. L.J. 409-10 (1953). 
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I. THE NATURE OF A POWER OF DISPOSITION 
A power has been defined as an authority enabling one person 
to dispose of an interest in either realty or personalty which is 
vested in another.6 It is not, of itself, an estate or an absolute right 
in property.7 It does not vest in the donee of the power any title 
to or interest in the property which is the subject of the power.8 
Rather, the property is considered to be owned by the donor until 
the donee performs the legal act of exercising the power.9 
A power of disposition is usually considered to be a power, 
qualified or plenary, to consume the principal of a life estate, most 
frequently in some type of personal property.10 It differs, however, 
from other powers in that the only exercise necessary to divest the 
donor of his ownership is the use or disposition of the property by 
the donee in accordance with the donor's intent.11 Thus, where 
the power is so construed, the donee may sell or consume the 
property and effectively cut off the donor's interest. Where the 
power is absolute, the donee has virtually all of the normal inci-
dents of fee ownership.12 In fact, unless a gift over is provided in 
such a situation, most courts construe the donee's interest to be a 
fee.13 If, however, this absolute power of disposition is coupled 
with a life estate and a gift over is provided, the courts are divided 
on the question of the nature of the donee's interest.14 This di-
vergence in view stems not from a disagreement as to the proper 
standards of construction to be employed in ascertaining testa-
mentary intent, but rather from a theoretical divergence as to the 
very nature of a power of disposition. Since a power is considered 
6 In re Vanatta, 99 N.J. Eq. 339, 131 Atl. 515 (Ch. 1926); Bowerman v. Bowerman, 
67 Ohio App. 425, 35 N.E.2d 1012 (1941); Davis v. Kendall, 130 Va. 175, 107 S.E. 751 
(1921). 
7 See, e.g., Maryland Mut. Benevolent Soc'y v. Clendinen, 44 Md. 429, 434 (1876). 
8 Ibid. 
o Ibid. 
10 Summers, supra note 3, at 137. 
11 A mere alteration of the form of the property by the donee may not constitute 
a sufficient exercise to cut off a remainderman's rights in the substituted property. See 
text infra at 1331-32. In exercising a power of appointment, the donee is confined to the 
mode of execution provided for in the instrument creating it. Continental Nat'! Bank 
v. Mccampbell, 184 Ky. 658, 213 S.W. 193 (1919). If no method of execution is pro-
vided, the donee must indicate, in some manner, his intent to exercise it. Greenway v. 
White, 196 Ky. 745, 246 S.W. 137 (1922). He cannot use the property until or unless 
he has exercised the power. See Maryland Mut. Benevolent Soc'y v. Clendinen, 44 Md. 
429, 434 (1876). 
12 The sole restrictions on his use are that the power must be exercised during 
his lifetime and in good faith. Hardy v. Mayhew, 158 Cal. 95, 110 Pac. 113 (1910). 
13 Summers, supra note 3, at 138. 
14 Compare Brant v. Virginia Coal &: Iron Co., 93 U.S. 326 (1876), with Bean v. Myers, 
41 Tenn. 226 (1860). 
1322 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
as something separate and distinct from the ownership of the life 
estate, the majority of courts have given effect to the testator's 
intent by allowing the creation of this type of an interest in the 
donee.15 The minority, however, reasoning that for all practical 
purposes the donee has been given a fee for life, an estate unknown 
to the common law, invalidate the restriction on duration as an 
attempt to derogate from a fee.16 Although this latter view owes 
its genesis to a misunderstanding of an early decision of a Virginia 
court,17 it serves to illustrate a number of the basic theoretical 
problems involved in the use of powers of disposition. How far 
should a testator's intent to dispose of his property in a particu-
lar manner be circumscribed by historical considerations? Has a 
new type of estate been created through the use of this device? 
What are the differences between powers of disposition and powers 
of appointment? What are the differences between possession of 
a power of disposition and ownership of an estate? How much 
power can a testator give away and still retain ownership of the 
property? 
A power of disposition is more than a mere species of the 
power of appointment. Perhaps it is called a power to circumvent 
the traditional notion that one cannot derogate from the normal 
incidents of ownership once he has parted with what is, for most 
purposes, a fee interest in property. In any case, the donee of a 
power of disposition can be given almost any interest short of a 
fee and can be circumscribed in his use of property, not by the 
rules governing established estate patterns, but only by the testa-
tor's manifested intent.18 His interest is not, as such, a variation 
of the power of appointment, because its most significant character-
istic is the ability of the holder to use the property himself, not the 
authority to cause it to be transferred to another.19 In this way it 
resembles ownership of an interest in the property. Moreover, al-
though called a power, it can embrace almost all of the attributes 
15 E.g., Edds v. Mitchell, 143 Tex. 307, 184 S.W.2d 823 (1945). 
10 One jurisdiction has changed this rule by judicial decision. Quarton v. Barton, 
249 Mich. 474, 229 N.W. 465 (1930). Cf. M1cH. COMP. LAws § 13.003 (1948). In two other 
states the rule has been specifically abolished and repudiated by statute. VA. ConE ANN. 
§ 55-6 (1950); W. VA. ConE ch. 36, art. 1, § 16 (1931). Only two jurisdictions apparently 
still follow the rule. Davey v. Weber, 133 Colo. 365, 295 P.2d 688 (1956); Bradley v. 
Carnes, 94 Tenn. 27, 27 S.W. 1007 (1894). 
17 Burwell v. Anderson, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 376 (1831). See Summers, supra note 3, at 140. 
18 See Volz v. Kaemmerle, 211 Iowa 995, 234 N.W. 805 (1931); In the Matter of 
Smith, 126 Misc. 296, 214 N.Y. Supp. 176 (Surr. Ct. 1926); Levenson v. Wolfson, 42 
Ohio App. 332, 182 N.E. 116 (1931). 
19 See note II supra. 
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of an estate, including every right in the property necessary to 
effect its disposition20 except an ability on the part of its holder to 
leave the property in his estate at death.21 In contrast, a power 
of appointment is generally much more closely circumscribed and 
must be exercised in the exact manner prescribed by the testator.22 
Its basic purpose is not specifically to give the first taker something 
which is of especial immediate value to him, but to postpone dis-
tribution of the testator's estate in fee and, at some later time, to 
effect its distribution.23 Even if the donee of a power of appoint-
ment can appoint to himself, he has no real possessory interest in 
the property until he does so, and then, and only then, can he 
exercise those prerogatives which characterize the donee of a 
power of disposition.24 
The courts have neither explicitly or implicitly answered most 
of the questions nor addressed themselves to many of the prob-
lems which permeate this area of property law. Instead, they have 
attempted to pigeonhole powers of disposition, by analogy, into 
established estate patterns,25 or have treated them as minor varia-
tions of powers of appointment.26 Since they fit these categories 
only imperfectly, the results have often been anomalous.27 Gen-
erally, the law governing a particular property scheme is peculiar 
to that scheme,28 and is inappropriate as to others. By allowing the 
use of a power of disposition, the courts are condoning the creation 
of a new type of estate and should, therefore, develop rules of law 
to fit the particular arrangement created. They can, of course, be 
guided by close conceptual analogies, but should not be restrained 
where the borrowed rules would be clearly inappropriate. Once 
this is realized, the critical question is not into which category the 
power of disposition more properly belongs, but what are the cir-
20 See Swarthout v. Ranier, 143 N.Y. 499, 38 N.E. 726 (1894) (life tenant had right 
to mortgage the property). 
21 The donee, however, cannot devise the property. In re Raynor, 254 N.Y. 516, 
173 N .E. 846 (1930). And the donee must exercise the power in good faith. Endsley 
v. Hagey, 301 Pa. 158, 151 Atl. 799 (1930). 
22 Sec Lewis's Estate, 269 Pa. 379, 112 Atl. 454 (1921). 
23 See Note, 28 IND. L.J. 409, 413 (1953). 
24 Until such time as he appoints to himself, he cannot use, dispose of, or encumber 
the property. Maryland Mut. Benevolent Soc'y v. Clendinen, 44 Md. 429, 434 (1876). 
25 E.g., Brant v. Virginia Coal &: Iron Co., 93 U.S. 326 (1876). 
26 See Burleigh v. Clough, 52 N.H. 267 (1872), overruled on points not here involved 
in Emery v. Haven, 67 N.H. 503, 35 Atl. 940 (1893). In Burleigh, the court used power 
of appointment terminology and rested its decision on power of appointment concepts. 
21 The testator's intent may be obvious, but the court may not feel free to give 
complete effect to it because the life tenant will have more power than life tenants 
"should have." See Mowery v. Coffman, 185 Va. 491, 39 S.E.2d 285 (1946). 
28 See generally HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 206-46 (1881). 
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cumstances under which its use should be permitted, and what 
limits, if any, should be placed upon that use. In addition to point-
ing out some of the problem areas of which the practitioner should 
be aware, this comment will attempt to show where it is necessary 
that such lines be drawn and distinctions be made. The exact 
shape of the law relating to powers of disposition must, of course, 
ultimately depend upon whether and to what extent the courts 
are willing to recognize a deviation from normal estate patterns. 
This is essentially a decision of policy dependent, at least in part, 
upon the willingness of the courts to relinquish control in what 
has traditionally been an area subject to extensive judicial super-
vision and one in which property concepts have become rather 
firmly established. Each jurisdiction must decide this for itself. 
It will be of some benefit, however, to describe the problems and 
illustrate possible solutions in selected areas. 
Il. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A POWER OF DISPOSITION 
The chief advantage of a power of disposition lies in the flexi-
bility it allows the testator in disposing of his property. He can 
provide the first taker with an interest approximating complete 
ownership or, by the imposition of standards or restrictions on con-
sumption, relegate him to the status of a quasi-trustee.29 He can 
give a life tenant more discretion than is permissible under any 
other property arrangement and thus more adequately prepare 
him to cope with unanticipated situations. Yet, at the same time, 
the primary beneficiary need not be burdened with the necessity 
of obtaining third-party consent to a particular use or disposition 
of the property, as would be the case were a trust involved. More-
over, the administrative procedure is generally less complex than 
in the trust setting, and expenses of administration, which are 
relatively high in even modest-sized trusts, are virtually non-exist-
ent.30 Yet, the very aspects of a power of disposition which make it 
attractive as a dispositive device are the source of numerous prob-
lems. The greater freedom given the life tenant renders less secure 
the estate of the remainderman.31 Vagueness in the standards 
which the testator imposes on the power, though necessary to 
promote flexibility, provides a frequent source of litigation.82 Prob-
20 Compare Shapleigh v. Shapleigh, 69 N.H. 577, 44 Atl. 107 (1889), with Peckham 
v. Lego, 57 Conn. 553, 19 Atl. 392 (1889). 
80 See Note, 32 NoTRE DAME LAw. 141, 143 (1956). 
31 See Norvell, supra note 2, at 11. 
82 See Note, 28 !ND. L.J. 409, 411 (1953). 
1963] COMMENTS 1325 
!ems inherent in determining the nature and extent of the life 
tenant's interest create uncertainty as to the title he is able to 
convey, the rights of creditors with regard to the property, and the 
tax consequences of the arrangement.33 While many of these 
problems become less critical where the testator has, expressly or 
impliedly, qualified the power as to matters other than its dura-
tion, they nevertheless are involved in any determination of 
whether the advantages of using the power outweigh the dis-
advantages. 
Ill. EXECUTION OF A POWER OF DISPOSITION 
As indicated earlier,34 some courts do not recognize the validity 
of an unqualified power of disposition given to a life tenant. Al-
though they concede that testamentary intent should generally 
govern in the construction of wills, they feel that it should not 
override settled property law. Hence, new estates should not be 
created, and a person receiving most of the important ingredients 
of a particular estate should be held, for most purposes, to have 
received that estate.35 
These same considerations, however, are also relevant to an 
understanding of the approach of some of those courts which do 
not peremptorily condemn the gift of an absolute power of dis-
position to a life tenant. They, too, are bound by habitual ways 
of viewing testamentary gifts and do not feel comfortable about 
giving a life tenant "too much," although they are still willing 
to call him a life tenant.36 In the name of testamentary intent they 
whittle away what has been given by the language of the will until 
the donee is left with an interest which is considerably more cir-
cumscribed than that which the testator probably intended.37 The 
degree to which a court feels insecure in allowing deviations from 
the normal property patterns determines the extent to which 
restrictions on the power of the life tenant will be implied.38 
Generally, it is held, as a minimum, that he must exercise the 
33 These problems are subsequently discussed in detail. 
34 See note 16 supra. 
35 See Mowery v. Coffman, 185 Va. 491, 39 S.E.2d 285 (1946). 
36 See Watson's Estate, 241 Pa. 271, 274, 88 Atl. 433, 436 (1913). 
37 See Carpenter v. Lothringer, 224 Iowa 439, 275 N.W. 98 (1937). But see Colburn 
v. Burlingame, 190 Cal. 697, 214 Pac. 226 (1923), where the life tenant was probably 
given more discretion than the testator would have liked. 
38 Compare In re Ithaca Trust Co., 220 N.Y. 437, 116 N.E. 102 (1917) (donee could 
give away the property), with Braley v. Spragins, 221 Ala. 150, 128 So. 149 (1930) (donee 
could not give the property away). 
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power during his lifetime and in good faith. He cannot devise 
or bequeath the property,39 give it away4° or commit waste,41 al-
though a few courts have intimated that they are powerless to 
forestall the latter.42 
When the testator explicitly imposes standards or restrictions 
on the life tenant's power, a great many of the conceptual dif-
ficulties disappear, though practical problems of construction are 
still present. Since the standards are usually left sufficiently vague 
to insure flexibility to the life tenant, there is often considerable 
doubt as to whether the appropriate circumstances exist under 
which an exercise of the power is justified.43 A gift limited to 
"support and maintenance," for example, is subject to divergent 
interpretation,44 depending upon the station in life of the par-
ticular donee, thereby permitting the remainderman to contend 
that the life tenant is exceeding his authority. Limiting a gift to 
"need" is equally susceptible to varied constructions.45 In both of 
these cases, however, unless there is an objection from the remain-
derman, the life tenant still has considerably greater freedom than 
he would have in the trust setting, where he must go to a trustee 
to obtain permission to invade the corpus of the estate.46 
There is still another doubt-filled area concerning the scope 
of the power given the life tenant. Generally, he is held to possess 
that amount of power necessary to effectuate the purposes of the 
testator.47 This would seem to include the ability to convey a fee, 
as well as to exercise all of those powers over the property which 
are incidental to the execution of such a conveyance. However, 
courts are in disagreement over this issue also,48 and it has been 
held that a life tenant who is given an express power of disposi-
tion can convey the fee, but cannot mortgage or charge the prop-
39 Brookover v. Branyan, 185 Ind. 1, 112 N.E. 769 (1916). 
40 Braley v. Spragins, 221 Ala. 150, 128 So. 149 (1930). 
41 Cross v. Hendry, 39 Ind. App. 246, 79 N.E. 531 (1906). 
42 Hanna v. Ladewig, 73 Tex. 37, 11 S.W. 133 (1889); Young v. Campbell, 175 S.W. 
1100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915). 
43 See Hull v. Culver, 34 Conn. 403 (1867). · 
44 Compare In re Smith, 231 App. Div. 277, 247 N.Y. Supp. 263 (1931), with Hamilton 
v. Hamilton, 149 Iowa 321, 128 N.W. 380 (1910). 
45 Compare Stevens v. Flower, 46 N.J. Eq. 340, 19 Atl. 777 (Ch. 1890), with Paxton 
v. Bond, 15 S.W. 875 (Ky. 1891). 
46 Smith v. Field, 98 N.J. Eq. 532, 131 Atl. 521 (Ch. 1926), illustrates a situation where 
the donee of a qualified power of disposition had to obtain the permission of the donor's 
executor or of the court before he could invade the corpus of the estate. 
47 See Volz v. Kaemmerle, 211 Iowa 995, 234 N.W. 805 (1931); Pennebaker Home 
for Girls v. Board of Directors, 250 Ky. 44, 45, 61 S.W .2d 883, 884 (1933). 
48 Compare Levenson v. Wolfson, 42 Ohio App. 332, 182 N.E. 116 (1931), with 
Fields v. Kline, 161 Ark. 418, 256 S.W. 355 (1923). 
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erty, a conclusion which makes little sense in most circumstances.49 
Some courts have held that where the life tenant is given a life 
estate with full power to dispose of it as he pleases, he can convey 
only his life interest,50 although the majority hold that, since he 
already had the power to convey his life interest, he added words 
giving him a power are meaningless unless they refer to the dispo-
sition of a fee.51 
The controlling consideration in determining the power and 
scope of authority of the life tenant is, of course, the testator's in-
tent, but this is difficult to determine unless the testator explicitly 
spells out the standards. Yet, if he does this, he may be curtailing 
the ability of the life tenant to adjust to changing circumstances, 
one of the main advantages of using the power of disposition. 
IV. RIGHTS OF CREDITORS 
A court's conception of the nature and extent of the interest 
of the donee of a power of disposition will determine the rights 
of his creditors. 52 In general, their treatment is similar to that of 
creditors of the donees of powers of appointment who, under the 
common law, had rights only when the debtor had a general 
power of appointment and exercised it during his lifetime.53 
Courts adhering to this view hold that the donee must have an 
absolute power of disposition and must exercise some control over 
the principal of the estate before his creditors can reach it.54 Since 
the actions of the donee in such case show an exercise of dominion 
over the property approaching ownership, and since creditors' 
rights are based on the ownership by the debtor of an interest 
in property, this appears to be a theoretically justifiable result.55 
A number of states have altered this common-law approach 
by statute and have provided that creditors of the donees of both 
49 This conclusion is generally justified on the ground that the testator would have 
indicated his intent to allow the life tenant to mortgage the property if such had actually 
been his intent. See Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 14 R.I. 
625 (1885). 
50 Brant v. Virginia Coal 8: Iron Co., 93 U.S. 326 (1876). 
111 Foudray v. Foudray, 44 Ind. App. 444, 89 N.E. 499 (1909). There is, however, 
some question as to whether a sale of the property will be a sufficient exercise of the 
power to convey the fee to a purchaser, if the sale was not made in conformity with 
the testator's intent. See text infra at 1329. 
112 For a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of rights of creditors in this 
area, see Whiteside 8: Edelstein, Life Estates With Power To Consume, 16 CORNELL 
L.Q. 447 (1931). 
11s See United States v. Field, 255 U.S. 257 (1921). 
11-1 Whiteside 8e Edelstein, supra note 52, at 449. 
m; See Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200 (1879). 
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general powers of appointment and absolute powers of disposition 
can look to the property subject to the power if the donee is able, 
in his lifetime, to appoint or dispose of the entire fee for his own 
benefit.56 The subject of the power is treated as the absolute prop-
erty of the donee whether or not he exercises his power and not-
withstanding the presence of a gift over.57 This approach is con-
sistent with the modern tendency to look to the substance rather 
than the form of a disposition in determining third-party rights.58 
Where the donee has received only a qualified power of dispo-
sition, limited, for instance, to support, the courts have generally 
reverted to the traditional argument, used also to protect special 
powers of appointment, that a power itself is not an interest in 
property.59 However, an exception is made where the creditor 
can show that the debt arose from transactions consummated in 
circumstances where the testator contemplated that the power 
would be exercised,60 as where a grocer-creditor attempts to reach 
assets which are the subject of a power limited by some standard 
relating to the donee's support and maintenance. 
It is readily apparent, then, that creditors' rights are being 
determined, not by an analysis of the properties of the power of 
disposition involved, but by analogy to other types of dispositions. 
This is unfortunate, since the rights incident to such other dispo-
sitions were formulated with specific reference to their particular 
characteristics and qualities.61 A given power of disposition, as 
indicated earlier, has many characteristics which are similar to 
those possessed by other property arrangements, but also many 
which are different, depending upon the particular arrangement 
which the testator created. It often seems anomalous that creditors 
of the donee cannot reach the property subject to the power, since 
the donee, in many circumstances, has such great control over it, 
even where the power is qualified. An accurate evaluation of the 
rights of creditors can be made only by conducting a detailed 
56 ALA. CoDE tit. 47, §§ 76-79, 92 (1958); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1005 to -1010 (1961); 
MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 556.9-.13, .21, .32 (1948); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw §§ 149-53, 159, 164; 
N.D. CENT. CoDE §§ 59-05-39 to -43, -50 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 262-66, 
274 (1941); S.D. CODE §§ 59.0439-.0443, .0451 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-106 (1955); 
WIS. STAT. §§ 232.08-.12, .20, .31 (1959). 
57 Whiteside &: Edelstein, supra note 52, at 461. 
58 In re Davies' Estate, 242 N.Y. 196, 151 N.E. 205 (1926). 
59 Price v. Cherbonnier, 103 Md. 107, 63 Atl. 209 (1906); Prescott v. Wordell, 319 
Mass. 118, 65 N.E.2d 19 (1946). 
60 Morehead v. Martin, 123 Kan. 612, 256 Pac. 1010 (1927) (will allowing life tenant 
to sell property in order to purchase home subjected such property to claims of vendor 
of homesite). 
61 See generally 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 23.14-.18 (Casner ed. 1952). 
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study of the particular properties of each power of disposition in 
the light of the testator's probable intent to determine the extent 
to which they give the donee something approaching ownership. 
V. RIGHTS OF PURCHASERS 
The difficulties inherent in ascertaining the interest of the 
donee of a power of disposition render the purchase of such an 
interest relatively undesirable. The purchaser is always faced 
with the possibility of a lawsuit by a disappointed remainderman 
claiming that the exercise of the power was unwarranted. The 
remainderman can argue that the sale was not an effective exercise 
of the power because such sale was not one of the permissible 
modes by which the testator intended that the power be exercised, 
and was, therefore, not effective to transfer title. For this reason, 
unless the donee can in some way guarantee his title, a price far 
below the market value of the fee will be all that he can obtain. 
Perhaps the most satisfactory solution, if it is economically feasi-
ble, is to have the remainderman join in the conveyance. If this 
is not possible, the donee can institute some form of declaratory 
proceeding, 62 or arrange with the buyer for a post-purchase action 
which will try title and allow rescission if full title is not found 
in the donee. 63 
The necessity for, and the cumbersome nature of, these de-
vices are a sad commentary on both the state of the law and the 
ability of draftsmen in this area. Not only does their use result in 
an increase in cost to the purchaser, but the intent of the testator 
is often frustrated by the imposition of an additional burden on 
the life tenant when he attempts to dispose of the property.64 
Since, however, the draftsman must live with the law, he could 
alleviate some of the difficulties by providing, in the instrument 
granting the power, a clear exposition of both the scope of the 
02 See Pa.xton v. Paxton, 141 Iowa 96, 119 N.W. 284 (1909). But the life tenant 
cannot have his title quieted as to his right to convey a fee. Foudray v. Foudray, 44 Ind. 
App. 444, 89 N.E. 499 (1909). 
os This is generally accomplished by an action for specific performance. Hall v. 
Wardwell, 228 N.C. 562, 46 S.E.2d 556 (1948); Tillett v. Ni.xon, 180 N.C. 195, 104 S.E. 352 
(1920); Gelb v. Weisberger, 247 Pa. 416, 93 Atl. 499 (1915). A type of declaratory pro-
ceeding, not involving a legal action as such, may sometimes be used. Hardee v. Rivers, 
228 N.C. 66, 44 S.E.2d 476 (1947). Also, an action to have the contract cancelled may be 
resorted to; in such case, the purchaser brings an action for cancellation of the contract, 
claiming that the vendor cannot convey the fee. Harlan v. Manington, 152 Iowa 707, 
133 N.W. 367 (1911). And the life tenant may bring an action to recover the purchase 
money. Henninger v. Henninger, 202 Pa. 207, 51 Atl. 749 (1902). 
64 See Fields v. Kline, 161 Ark. 418, 256 S.W. 355 (1923). 
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title the donee may. convey and the circumstances under which 
such a conveyance is permissible. This, of course, would restrict 
the flexibility which the testator is able to give the donee, but 
would, nevertheless, serve to render the gift more secure. Perhaps 
the most effective way to resolve this difficulty is to give the donee 
an absolute power to sell, and impose any restriction which may 
be deemed desirable only upon his application of the proceeds 
of the sale. 
VI. RIGHTS OF R.EMAINDERMEN 
The position of a remainderman succeeding the donee of a 
power of disposition is, at most, precarious. The very nature of 
the power removes most of the safeguards inherent in the normal 
life tenant-remainderman relationship.65 Also, since the testator's 
primary motive is generally construed to be to benefit the life 
tenant, courts have been more solicitous of his welfare than that 
of the remainderman.66 They have been most unwilling, except 
in extreme circumstances, to substitute their judgment for that of 
the life tenant in determining whether the power was exercised 
in proper circumstances.67 To do so would be to take the flexi-
bility out of the power and place the court in the position of a 
quasi-trustee.68 
Although some decisions have indicated that a power of dis-
position may be expressed so broadly as to preclude the court 
from preventing even fraud and waste on the part of the donee,69 
most courts impose a requirement of "good faith" on his exercise 
of the power.70 The ingredients of the required "good faith" are 
determined by reference to the testator's probable intent.71 Thus, 
where it can be shown that the donee has acted in bad faith, as 
where he is attempting to deprive the remainderman of his in-
terest, or has exceeded, or is about to exceed, his authority, the 
remainderman is generally entitled to relief.72 In justification of 
65 Norvell, The Power To Consume: Estate Plan or Estate Confusion?, Mich. S.B.J., 
March 1949, pp. 5, 11. 
66 See Note, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1162, 1163 (1953). 
67 See Reddin v. Cottrell, 178 Ark. 1178, 13 S.W.2d 813 (1929); Miller v. Miller, 
149 Tenn. 463, 261 S.W. 965 (1923). 
68 See, e.g., Garriott v. Garriott, 208 Ky. 94, 270 S.W. 484 (1925), where it was held 
that the life tenant must apply for permission from the court before a sale of any of 
the corpus could be made. See also Graves v. Jasper, 233 Ky. 388, 25 S.W.2d 1040 (1930). 
69 Hanna v. Ladewig, 73 Tex. 37, 11 S.W. 133 (1889). 
70 See Matthews v. Capshaw, 109 Tenn. 480, 72 S.W. 964 (1902), for an excellent 
statement of the "good faith" rule in a slightly different context. 
71 See Watson's Estate, 241 Pa. 271, 274, 88 Atl. 433, 436 (1913). 
72 See In the Matter of Niles, 122 Misc. 17, 202 N.Y. Supp. 475 (Surr. Ct. 1923), 
afj'd, 211 App. Div. 826, 206 N.Y. Supp. 940 (1924). 
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this position, and to give the remainderman the necessary stand-
ing, it is often said that the life tenant and remainderman stand 
in a debtor-creditor relationship,73 or that the life tenant holds 
the corpus in trust for the remainderman.74 However, neither of 
these characterizations is accurate; they are merely vehicles used 
to reach judicially desired results. It would perhaps be better if 
the courts explicitly recognized this and gave the remainderman 
standing based on the probable intent of the testator that he have 
it in such circumst&nces. There. is too great a chance, otherwise, 
that trust law or debtor-creditor law will be applied inappropri-
ately to situations for which they were not designed. 
Where the property has been disposed of before the remain-
derman discovers an abuse of discretion or seeks relief, he should 
be able to recover his proven losses from the property or estate 
of the donee.75 The difficulty, however, lies in determining 
whether there has been an abuse of power. Courts have been 
reluctant to require the donee to account for his use of the prop-
erty in the absence of a strong showing of fraud, waste or improv-
idence, frequently a heavy burden of proof for the remainderman 
to bear.76 Moreover, it becomes doubly heavy where the donee is 
dead and the remainderman seeks to trace the assets through a 
series of transactions which took place a considerable time ago. 
Also, even if the remainderman attempts to recover by the use of 
a conversion theory, tracing may still be necessary, since it is prob-
able that only the value of those assets disposed of in breach of the 
power can be recovered, and the remainderman must identify 
them. 
Difficulty in tracing may be encountered in yet another con-
text. At the donee's death he is very likely to have not only par-
tially unconsumed property of the testator, but assets of his own 
estate as well. Although it is reasonably clear that he could not, 
with impunity, have simply transferred the assets of the testator's 
estate to his own,77 he might conceivably have changed their 
form through sale and the purchase of other goods, and left them 
as assets of his own estate; or he might have used assets of the 
73 In re Powell's Estate, 340 Pa. 404, 17 A.2d 391 (1941). 
74 Belton v. Myers, 87 Ind. App. 35, 154 N.E. 695 (1927); Hunt v. Smith, 58 N.J. 
Eq. 25, 43 Atl. 428 (Ch. 1899). 
71i See Rock Island Bank & Trust Co. v. Rhoads, 353 III. 131, 187 N.E. 139 (1933); 
Graham v. Stroh, 342 Mo. 686, ll7 S.W.2d 258 (1938). 
76 See Nelson v. Horsford, 201 Iowa 918, 208 N.W. 341 (1926). 
77 This would allow him to take a fee in the specific property, which is contrary to 
the testator's intent as evidenced by the way he set up the testamentary gift. 
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testamentary estate during his lifetime and conserved his own. 
Assuming that this is contrary to the testator's intent, it is unclear 
what proof the courts would require of a complaining remain-
derman. At a minimum, he would probably have to show that the 
life tenant engaged in such transactions and be able to trace the 
assets to the life tenant's estate.78 This would often be virtually 
impossible. Moreover, there is some judicial indication that, 
through such schemes, the life tenant has the power to defeat the 
rights of the remainderman and that the assets become part of the 
life tenant's estate.79 
Perhaps the answer to the remainderman's troubles lies in the 
establishment of a trust, but again this places duties and restric-
tions upon the donee which may frustrate the overall intent of the 
testator. Also, if the donee is made the trustee, a question of the 
validity of the trust may arise, since some courts do not permit 
the trustee to be his own, and only, beneficiary.80 
VII. TAX CONSIDERATIONS 
A draftsman considering the use of a power of disposition 
should pay careful attention to the tax consequences of his deci-
sion. Testamentary transfers, of which the transfer of property 
subject to a power of disposition is one, may be taxed by both 
state and federal governments, although a federal estate tax credit 
is generally given for state succession taxes previously paid on 
the property.81 The taxes are usually of two types: an inheritance 
tax, which is levied on the interest which each beneficiary receives, 
and an estate tax, which is levied on the estate left by the testator. 
The majority of states have inheritance tax statutes, while the 
federal government and a few states levy estate taxes.82 
Under the federal estate tax provisions, as contained in In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954, the estate of the donee of a power 
of disposition may also be taxed unless the exercise of the power is 
limited by an "ascertainable standard" relating to the health, edu-
cation, support, or maintenance of the donee.83 Where the power 
is limited or restricted, however, a donee spouse cannot qualify 
78 See Edds v. Mitchell, 143 Tex. 307, 184 S.W.2d 823 (1945). 
79 See Archer v. Palmer, 112 Ark. 527, 167 S.W. 99 (1914). 
so Rose v. Hatch, 125 N.Y. 427, 26 N.E. 467 (1891). 
81 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2011. 
82 Arizona, Mississippi, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, and Vermont have estate tax statutes, The remainder, except Nevada, have 
inheritance tax statutes. 
83 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 204l(b)(l)(A). 
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the property for the marital deduction allowed by section 2056. 84 
Moreover, even if a spouse is given an absolute power of disposi-
tion, which would appear to qualify for the deduction under the 
broad definition of a general power of appointment contained in 
section 2041(b),85 at least one court86 has indicated that it does not 
qualify where, under state law, such power must be exercised in 
"good faith," for the reason that it is not then a power "exercisable 
in all events."87 If other courts, including state courts which have 
statutes similar to the federal provisions, follow this holding, the 
use of an absolute power of disposition in making gifts or bequests 
to donee-spouses would be seriously curtailed. 88 
Application of state inheritance tax statutes to a power of dis-
position necessitates the computation of the present value of the 
interests received by the life tenant and remainderman.89 The 
tentative nature of the remainderman's interest renders this deter-
mination extremely difficult, for the life tenant may either con-
sume the entire estate during his lifetime or die leaving it sub-
stantially intact. Solutions to the taxing problem differ, but 
generally statutory provision is made for deferring payment of 
the tax on the remainderman's interest until the property vests 
in him, 00 or for giving him a refund for any overpayment which 
he makes by paying tax on the present remainder value of the 
property.01 The life tenant is usually taxed only on the value of 
a life estate in the whole property,02 as if there were no possibility 
84 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(5). 
85 "The term 'general power of appointment' means a power which is exercisable 
in favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate .... " 
86 United States v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 297 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1962), reversing 
188 F. Supp. 839 (W.D.N.Y. 1960). 
87 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(5). 
88 Many of the state statutes are patterned after the federal statute. See generally 
1-4 CCH INH., EST. &: GIFT TAX REP. (State) (1962). 
80 See IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-2405 (1953); Ind. Dep't of State Revenue, Inheritance Tax 
Div. Reg. § 5 (1949). 
oo Alaska, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
'Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming have statutes of this type. 
01 California, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Caroli_na, South Dakota, Vermont, and Washington 
have statutes of this type. Several states afford the remaindennan an option of paying 
the tax presently at the rate prescribed or deferring payment until the interest vests 
in possession or enjoyment: California, District of Columbia, Idaho, Missouri, Montana, 
and Oregon. 
92 4 CCH !NH., EST. &: GIFT TAX REP. 11 1845, at 80317 (1962), indicates that there 
is no general agreement among the various jurisdictions as to whether the life tenant 
with a power of disposition should be taxed only on the life estate or upon the full 
value of the property. 
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that he could get the benefit of more or divest the remainderman's 
interest. This serves to place him in a lower tax bracket than he 
would be in were he deemed to have the fee, and would seem, in 
most cases, to accord with the testator's primary purpose. 
Whether or not the use of a power of disposition will involve 
unfavorable tax consequences will generally depend on the size 
of the testamentary estate. If it substantially exceeds the 60,000 
dollar federal estate tax exemption, the probabilities are that it 
will, since the property subject to the power may either fail to 
qualify for the marital deduction or be taxed again in the donee's 
estate, should any of it remain unconsumed at his death.98 In 
such case, therefore, all of the other desires of the testator must 
be considered and this aspect balanced negatively. If, however, 
the estate is small, tax considerations should not be a controlling 
factor in any final decision. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The use of a power of disposition may enable a testator to 
effectuate more closely his desires with regard to the use and 
disposition of his property than any other accepted form of testa-
mentary transfer. Its utility, however, will depend upon a number 
of factors and uncertainties which he must first take into account. 
The courts have not been consistent in their approach in balanc-
ing the intent of the testator with the formalisms of established 
testamentary disposition. Only when they become aware that 
analogies to powers of appointment or other established estate 
patterns are insufficient to resolve the special difficulties presented 
by powers of disposition will a satisfactory solution to this prob-
lem be formulated. Until then, practical considerations must 
determine the course to be taken. Where an estate is large, the 
necessity for flexible control by the life tenant is diminished, and 
a trust is probably the better solution for a testator who wishes 
to control the further devolution of his property. The trustee can 
be given wide discretion as to the invasion of the corpus and the 
interest of the life tenant can be adequately protected. The small 
estate presents a rather different basic question. There the ad-
vantages of the power of disposition must be weighed against the 
93 Regardless of the size of the estate, so long as the amount is above the basic 
$60,000 exemption provided by § 2052 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, the initial 
tax cost will be greater when a life estate with a power of disposition or consumption 
is given to the donee than where he is given an outright fee or a general power of 
appointment in trust. See Note, 28 IND. L.J. 409, 428 n.82 (1953). 
uncertainties of its effectiveness. As a less expensive and more flex-
ible dispositive device, it often presents an attractive alternative
to other methods of testamentary transfer.
Lawrence Ray Bishop, S.Ed.
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